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MISSION AND SCOPE: The International Agricultural Trade and Policy Center 
(IATPC) was established in 1990 in the Food and Resource Economics Department 
(FRED) of the Institute of Food and Agricultural Sciences (IFAS) at the University of 
Florida. Its mission is to provide information, education, and research directed to 
immediate and long-term enhancement and sustainability of international trade and 
natural resource use. Its scope includes not only trade and related policy issues, but also 
agricultural, rural, resource, environmental, food, state, national and international 




 The Center’s objectives are to: 
 
•  Serve as a university-wide focal point and resource base for research on 
international agricultural trade and trade policy issues 
•  Facilitate dissemination of agricultural trade related research results and 
publications 
•  Encourage interaction between researchers, business and industry groups, 
state and federal agencies, and policymakers in the examination and 
discussion of agricultural trade policy questions 
•  Provide support to initiatives that enable a better understanding of trade and 
policy issues that impact the competitiveness of Florida and southeastern 







Abstract: This paper investigates the determinants of intra-CARICOM bilateral trade 
and the CARICOM member’s trade with the North American and European countries 
using the gravity model.  Seventeen annual cross-sections are estimated for the period 
1980 through 1996.  Overall, the empirical results indicate that the gravity model has  
considerable potential to explain intra-CARICOM bilateral trade as well as trade between 
CARICOM members and non-members.  The evidence suggests that both the importer’s 
GDP per capita and the exporter’s GDP per capita exert strong positive effects on 
CARICOM trade levels.  Since these effects are found to be statistically the same, we 
conclude that the gravity model is symmetric with respect to GDP per capita.  Further, 
sharing a common language, colonial ties, or membership in the CARICOM all 
significantly contribute to larger volumes of bilateral trade, while geographic distance has 
the opposite effect.  Both the exporting and the importing countries’ populations have a 
positive effect on trade levels, indicating that larger economies have a wider production 
base and thus export and import more than would smaller economies.   
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CARICOM BILATERAL TRADE: A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS USING THE 
GRAVITY MODEL 
 




Created in 1973 by the Treaty of Chagauramas, CARICOM is the oldest regional 
grouping in the hemisphere.  The original Caribbean Community (CARICOM) was 
comprised of the 12 English-speaking countries: Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, 
Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, 
St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and Trinidad and Tobago.  Dutch-speaking Suriname 
was admitted in 1995, and The Bahamas and Haiti are in the process of being admitted.   
While CARICOM is the largest regional grouping in the Western hemisphere in terms of 
member countries, it is by far the smallest in terms of economic size.  The total 
population of CARICOM excluding Haiti is about 6 million, and its combined gross 
domestic product (GDP) in 1997 was roughly $20 billion (Inter-American Development 
Bank, 2000). 
Over the past two decades, there has been significant progress in liberalizing 
global trade.  In addition to the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA) and 
its various extensions
1, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the 
creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO), a multitude of bilateral and plurilateral 
trade agreements have been enacted.  Additionally, rapid innovation in information 
technology has fostered unprecedented growth in foreign direct investment, which has 
served to significantly deepen economic integration within the hemisphere (European 
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, 1999).     2
Against this backdrop, the export performance of CARICOM has been mixed.  
During the past decade, the nominal value of CARICOM exports to the United States’ 
(US) market has grown at a rate of roughly 6% per annum.  This compares to an annual 
rate of growth of 17% for the Central American Common Market (CACM) grouping.  
The growth in the nominal value of CARICOM exports to the European Union (EU) over 
this same period was only about 3%, suggesting a decline in export performance in real 
terms. Exports to Canada over the past decade have grown substantially, averaging about 
13% per annum in real terms.  However, this growth has occurred from a small base and 
two countries, Jamaica and Guyana, account for virtually all of these exports (Jessen and 
Rodriguez, 1999). 
CARICOM trade is also highly concentrated.  Trinidad and Jamaica accounted for 
over two thirds of the value of total CARICOM merchandise exports in 1999 
(FAOSTAT, 2001).  Similar disparities exist in terms of agricultural trade.  Three 
countries, Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad, accounted for 60% of total value of agricultural 
exports in 1999. In contrast, the Organization for Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) 
accounted for only 11% of total agricultural exports in that same year.  A similar story 
emerges in term of intra-CARICOM agricultural trade.  In 1997, 75% of intra-
CARICOM imports of agricultural products originated in Barbados, Guyana and 
Trinidad.  In contrast, seven countries supplied less than 4% of agricultural products each 
to the regional market. 
CARICOM’s external trade performance is a bit disturbing in that a significant 
portion of exports enters external markets under preferential arrangements.  Virtually all 
                                                                                                                                                                             
1 The most recent manifestation is the Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act, which extended preferences 
to virtually all products.   3
of CARICOM’s exports to the EU enter duty free.  The corresponding figures for the US 
and Canada are approximately 67% and 45%, respectively (Harrington, 1997).   
Continued movement towards liberalized trade within the hemisphere and globally will 
erode existing preference margins and thereby place increasing importance on fostering 
export diversification and improving the competitiveness of CARICOM goods and 
service in external markets. 
As it approaches its 30
th anniversary, the Community faces significant challenges 
on a number of fronts including negotiation of an FTAA and Regional Economic 
Partnership Agreements as stipulated in the Contonou Agreement.  The development of 
efficient and cohesive regional strategies to assure a positive outcome for the CARICOM 
is thus critical.  Forging such strategies, however, will be challenging as there is an 
almost total absence of empirical analysis investigating the economic impacts of a 
liberalized trading environment on CARICOM countries. 
To some extent, the absence of such research is understandable.  Most recent 
empirical analyses of potential economic impacts associated with trade liberalization in 
the hemisphere have been based on Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models 
(Burfisher, 2001; Diao, Somwaru and Roe, 2001; Valdes and Tsigas, 2001).  The 
technical and data requirements of CGE models generally result in CARICOM countries 
being subsumed into regional aggregates such a “Central America and the Caribbean” or 
“Latin America and the Caribbean.”  The size and many unique characteristics of 
CARICOM countries vis-à-vis other countries in these aggregates suggest that results 
obtained from such models may not be of great policy relevance for small island nations.   4
An alternative framework for analyzing the trade flows and potential impacts of 
trade liberalization is the use of gravity models.  Developed in the early 1960s, gravity 
models provide a convenient framework for analyzing bilateral trade flows with much 
more modest data requirements than CGE models.  As such, gravity models offer 
considerable potential for the analysis of bilateral trade flows in the framework of small 
developing countries.  
This paper provides an initial exploration into the use of gravity models to model 
bilateral CARICOM trade flows. The goals of this analysis are modest, seeking to assess: 
1) the ability of the gravity model to explain CARICOM bi-lateral trade flows; 2) the 
degree in which the CARICOM grouping influences trade flows; 3) the extent to which 
historical colonial ties impact trade flows; and 4) the degree in which a shared common 
language affects bilateral trade.  The plan of the paper is as follows.  The next section 
provides a general overview of the gravity model and its use in empirical analysis.   
Section three develops the empirical models used in the analysis, section four discusses 
the data used, and section five presents the empirical results.  Conclusions are presented 
in the final section. 
The Gravity Model 
  The origin of gravity model analysis in international trade is generally attributed 
to Tinbergen (1962) and Poyhonen (1963) who argued that bilateral trade flows between 
countries could be modeled by appealing to the Newtonian law of gravity.  The basic 
notion behind the gravity model is that bilateral trade flows between counties can be 
explained by three types of factors:  1) those that capture the potential of a country to 
export goods and services; 2) those that capture the propensity of a country to import   5
good and services; and 3) other conditioning factors that enhance or inhibit bilateral 
trade.  The first two sets of factors are the analogues of mass as used in the Newtonian 
physical law of gravitation.  The third set of factors are generally geographic or economic 
factors argued to influence this basic “attraction” of trade between any two countries. 
The gravity model has been used to analyze bilateral trade flows in a general 
context as well as in more specific frameworks such as the impact of regional integration, 
the influences of intellectual property rights, immigration, colonial ties, and geographic 
adjacency.  For diverse applications of the gravity model in recent literature, see among 
others Boisso and Ferrantino (1997), Breuss and Egger (1997, 1999), Cheng and Wall 
(1999), Frankel and Romer (1999), Garman, Petersen, and Gilliard (1999), Head and Ries 
(1998), McCallum (1995), Porojan (2001), Smith (1999), and Thoumi (1989a, 1989b).   
While successful empirically, the gravity model is sometimes criticized for its 
perceived lack of theoretical foundation and at first sight ad-hoc nature.  However, 
research by Linneman (1966), Anderson (1979), Bergstrand (1985, 1989), Helpman and 
Krugman (1985) and Evenett and Keller (1997) have developed various theoretical bases 
for the basic gravity model as well as several variations.  It has been shown that the 
gravity model can be derived, albeit incorporating numerous restrictions, from a partial 
general equilibrium framework.   
In its simplest form, the gravity model can be written as follows; 
 (1) 
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where Tij is the value of exports from country i to country j, Yi, Yj are measures of the 
economic sizes of countries i and j, respectively, most commonly measured by their 
GDP, Ni, Nj are measures of the economies’ “physical” size, most often measured by their   6
respective populations, Dij is the physical distance between the two countries, and u is a 
normally distributed error term capturing any random influences on bilateral trade.   
  Economic size, or GDP, of the exporting country measures its productive capacity 
and can be argued to be a proxy for the capital-labor ratio (Bergstrand, 1985).  As such, it 
is also an indicator of the range of products varieties available for export since a richer 
economy would have a larger economic base.  The importer’s GDP serves as an indicator 
of what Thoumi (1989a, 1989b) refers to as the absorptive capacity of imported goods.  A 
richer economy would have a higher demand for imported goods and would be able to 
absorb a wider variety of products.  Naturally, both countries’ incomes would have a 
positive effect on bilateral trade levels (Bergstrand 1985, 1989; Boisso and Ferrantino, 
1997; Breuss and Egger, 1997, 1999; Geraci and Prewo, 1977; Linnemann, 1966; 
Thoumi, 1989a, 1989b, Tinbergen, 1962).   
  It is also postulated that countries with large populations tend to have a more 
diversified production base and would therefore be more self-sufficient, and thus trade 
less.  However, countries with large populations also tend to have a larger industrial base 
and are able to capture more economies of scale in production than would smaller 
economies.  Consequently, large countries potentially have more products to offer on the 
world market.  Hence, the sign of the impact of physical size, or population, on bilateral 
trade levels is ambiguous.  Distance is included as a proxy for transaction costs.  The 
literature supports a strong negative relationship (Bergstrand 1985, 1989; Boisso and 
Ferrantino, 1997; Breuss and Egger, 1997, 1999; Geraci and Prewo, 1977; Linnemann, 
1966; Thoumi, 1989a, 1989b; Tinbergen, 1962).     7
It is common to augment the gravity model with variables that either increase or 
reduce trade through their impact on transaction costs or the overall institutional 
environment.  In previous research, such variables have included trade policy proxies, 
dummy variables for participation in regional trading agreements, for sharing a common 
commercial language, for sharing a common border, and common colonial ties.  Defining 
such proxy variables as vector W, the augmented gravity model becomes 
(2) 
ij ij u
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Some recent examples of the use of such proxies include Boisso and Ferrantino (1997), 
Breuss and Egger (1997, 1999), Cheng and Wall (1999), Frankel and Romer (1999), 
Garman, Petersen, and Gilliard (1999), Head and Ries (1998), McCallum (1995), Porojan 
(2001), Smith (1999), and Thoumi (1989a, 1989b). 
Model Specification  
To investigate the determinants of intra-CARICOM bilateral trade flows and 
CARICOM trade with North America and the countries of the European Union, a gravity 
model is estimated for each year over the 1980 to 1996 time period.  Accordingly, 17 
annual cross sections are estimated.  While the analysis of intra-CARICOM trade is the 
primary goal of this study, the strong trade relationships that the Caribbean economies 
have with the European Union (especially the United Kingdom, (UK)) and the NAFTA 
countries suggest the inclusion of these countries in the analysis.   
For the purpose of this study, vector W includes three binary variables.  It is 
postulated that there is a strong neo-colonial relationship between the CARICOM 
countries and the UK, since large trade volumes are exchanged between the former 
Caribbean colonies and the former imperial ruler.  A binary variable, Col, is thus   8
introduced to account for this effect.  Col is defined to equal 1 if the two trading partners 
are the UK and one of its former colonies in CARICOM, 0 otherwise.  It is also 
postulated that trade among CARICOM members differs from trade between CARICOM 
members and non-member countries.  To control for this effect, a binary variable, Car, is 
introduced.  Car is equal to 1 if both trading partners are members of CARICOM, 0 
otherwise. 
Finally, it has been shown in previous literature that having a common language 
encourages trade by reducing transaction costs.  Countries speaking the same language 
also tend to have cultural similarities, which usually lead to closer relationships and thus 
larger trade volumes.  The variable Lang is defined to equal 1 if both trading partners 
share a common language, 0 otherwise.  Note that the EU is treated as a non-English 
speaking entity in this regard.  Even though English is an official commercial language of 
the EU, 13 of its members do not speak English as their native tongue.   
Substituting these three binary variables into equation (2) and taking the natural 
logarithm of both sides, the following equation is obtained: 
 (3) 
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where Tij is the current US dollar value of bilateral exports from country i to country j in 
a given year, Yi and Yj are the GDPs of the respective economies in current US dollars for 
that particular year, Ni and Nj are each country’s population, Dij is the geographic 
distance in miles between their capitals, and Col,  Car, and Lang are defined above.   
Arguably one of the most appealing features of the gravity model is the interpretation of 
the estimated coefficients as elasticities due to the double log specification.  Thus, for   9
example, β1 is interpreted as the exporting country’s income elasticity of bilateral trade, 
β4 as the importing county’s population (or country size) elasticity of bilateral trade and 
so forth.   
  Note that thus far income is discussed in terms of absolute GDP.  In this context, 
the problem of economies of varying physical size arises.  For example, how should one 
compare the GDP of India to that of Luxembourg?  Obviously India has a much larger 
GDP than Luxembourg, but Luxembourg’s demand for imported goods will clearly be 
more advanced being that it is a developed economy.  As can be seen, using absolute 
GDP in this case is misleading.  Instead, if one uses GDP per capita in the gravity model 
rather than absolute GDP, one will better capture the impact of economic size of trading 
partners on bilateral trade.  Specifically, GDP per capita is a much better measure of the 
capital labor ratio in the exporting country, and thus is a better indicator of the nature of 
the production base and the variety of goods available for exports.  Similarly, GDP per 
capita for the importing country would much better capture absorptive capacity and the 
sophistication of demand for imported goods and services.   
  Inclusion of GDP per capita into the gravity model is accomplished by simple 
algebraic manipulation of equation (3) (Breuss and Egger, 1997).  Thus, we obtain  
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where β2
* = β2 - β1 and β4
* = β4 - β3.  A similar formulation is used by Garman, Petersen, 
and Gilliard (1999) and Smith (1999).  Also, Breuss and Egger (1997) point out that there 
is usually multicollinearity present between absolute GDP and population.  High   10
collinearity would affect standard errors, but by adjusting the model such collinearity is 
avoided.   
  Another issue arises when conceptualizing the meaning of the income per capita 
and population parameters.  By its construction, the gravity model is symmetric.  That is, 
one data point is country i’s exports to country j in period t, and another data point is 
country j’s exports to country i in that same period t.  Thus, each country is an importer at 
the same time as it is an exporter.  As such, the elasticities should be symmetric as well, 
and the direction of the trade flows should not matter.
2  As Breuss and Egger (1999) point 
out, from a theoretical viewpoint there is really no reason why the estimated income 
elasticity of the exporter should be different from that of the importer.  The same could 
be argued for the population parameters.  To test for symmetry, we impose the following 




4.  Consequently, these 
restrictions are tested in the empirical section.  
Data 
The data used in the analysis consist of annual observations over the 1980 through 
1996 period and encompass bilateral trade between 10 CARICOM members,
3 as well as 
their bilateral trade with the Bahamas, the US, Canada, Mexico, the UK, and the EU.  To 
avoid double counting the UK, the EU refers to the EU (with its current members for 
each year) minus the UK.   
                                                           
2 Baldwin (1997) indirectly imposes a similar restriction in his informal discussion on estimates obtained 
by Gros and Gonciarz (1996).  We mention this as a footnote since their model specification is slightly 
different from ours.   
 
3 The following ten CARICOM members were included in our sample: Barbados, Belize, Dominica, 
Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, St Kitts and Nevis, St Lucia, St Vincent and the Grenadines, and Trinidad and 
Tobago.  Due to poor data availability, Antigua and Barbuda, Haiti, Montserrat, and Suriname were 
dropped from the sample.     11
The data pertain to bilateral trade from country i to country j.  Import values are 
utilized since national authorities often more properly account for these than export 
values.  Henceforth, the trade data represents country j’s imports from country i and vice 
versa.  Bilateral trade data are obtained from the CARICOM Statistical Sub-Programme 
(1999).  Data for GDP are obtained from the International Monetary Fund’s International 
Financial Statistics Yearbook (2000).  Population figures are obtained from the Food and 
Agricultural Organization (2001).  GDP per capita are calculated by simply dividing a 
given country’s GDP by its population.  Distance data are obtained from Indo.com (2000) 
and Fitzpartrick and Modlin (1986).  Finally, imperial information is obtained from the 
Caribbean Community Secretariat (2001).  
The sample contains a total of 210 unique trading country pairs.  Each country 
pair appears no more than once in a time period.  Thus, for a given year, there can be no 
more than 210 trading pairs observed.  Due to missing data for certain countries during 
the latter part of the time period, the number of pairs in the later years is slightly lower.  
In total there are 3454 observations in the sample.   
The sample contains a total of 247 “zero observations”, that is in 247 instances 
out of 3454 data points there is no reported bilateral trade for particular country pairs.  
Given the double log specification, this poses a problem econometrically since one 
cannot take the logarithm of zero.  Just dropping these observations from the sample will 
result in a selectivity bias and would in turn result in biased estimates.  Indeed, there are 
reasons why these trade flows are zero and such effects would be lost if the observations 
are simply dropped.  Following Boisso and Ferrantino (1997) and Heid and Ries (1998),   12
a value of 1 is added to each observation of the dependent variable.  By adding 1, define 
Tij
* = (Tij +1) and the model thus becomes  
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Consequently, in the case where Tij = 0, lnTij
* = ln(1) = 0 still indicating a zero value for 
trade.  In the case where Tij > 0 the dependent variable becomes lnTij
* = ln(Tij +1), and 
empirical estimation is made possible.  
Empirical Results 
  A total of 17 annual cross-sectional regressions are estimated using ordinary least 
squares.  Due to data availability, the number of observations per year varies from 158 to 
210.  The empirical results are presented in Table 1.
4   
The initial diagnostic test is regarding our symmetry restrictions.  Using F-tests 
we fail to reject the null hypothesis that the estimated GDP per capita elasticity for the 
exporting and the importing country are statistically the same for 11 out of the 17 years at 
the 5 percent level.  When restricting the significance level to 1 percent, we are unable to 
reject the same hypotheses in 15 out of the 17 cases.  As such, it is inferred that the 
estimated elasticities essentially are statistically the same.  We were able to draw similar 
conclusions using likelihood ratio tests.  Our results stand in contrast with Breuss and 
Egger (1999). 
                                                           
4 We also estimate the gravity model according to the right hand formulation of equation (3), results are 
omitted to save space.  Naturally, both estimations yield the same R-squared and F-statistic values.  
However, we find that our chosen specification, equation (5), is preferred due to lower standard errors, 
further lending support for the notion that the presence of multicollinearity is greatly reduced by utilizing 
GDP per capita, rather than absolute GDP.  Similar conclusions were drawn by Breuss and Egger (1997).   13
  Similar F-tests were conducted to test whether or not the parameter estimates for 
the exporter’s and importer’s respective populations are statistically different.  The results 
suggest that the parameters are indeed statistically different, even beyond the 1 percent 
level.  In 16 out of the 17 years, we can reject the null hypothesis that the parameters for 
population are statistically identical.  Accordingly, our gravity model is found to be 
symmetric with respect to the per capita GDP parameters of the exporter and the 
importer, but asymmetric with respect to the estimated population parameters.   
Consequently, these are the results presented in Table 1. 
  Examination of the individual parameter estimates suggests that exporter’s GDP 
per capita and importer’s GDP per capita have statistically significant and positive effects 
on bilateral trade, thus confirming a priori expectations.  The effects of the exporter’s 
productive capacity and the importer’s absorptive ability of foreign goods on bilateral 
trade levels are in all but two years greater than unity.  The point estimates of the 17 
years vary between 0.96 to 1.71 in magnitude.  There is no clear trend in the variation of 
these parameter estimates.  Since the importer’s income elasticity is greater than unity (in 
all except two years) it can be concluded that bilateral imports are luxury goods (Breuss 
and Egger, 1999).   
The point estimates for the exporter’s and the importer’s populations are all 
statistically significant and positive for all years.  The estimated exporter population 
elasticities of bilateral trade are all greater than unity.  These estimates are rather stable 
and vary only marginally from year to year.  Our point estimates suggest that there is 
some validity to the argument that an exporter with a larger physical size benefits from a 
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larger productive base and economies of scale and will thus have more products to offer 
for export, resulting in more trade than in the case of a smaller country.   
The point estimates for the importer’s population elasticities are all positive (and 
greater than unity) indicating that a physically larger country would import more goods 
due to a larger consumer base even after controlling for income.  This is somewhat 
surprising since a larger economy also tend to trade less in relative terms due to a larger 
degree of self-sufficiency.  Clearly, in our sample, the effect of a larger consumer base 
outweighs the effect of self-sufficiency on bilateral trade levels.  This does make sense, 
since small island economies face constraints larger ones do not, thus there is a natural 
limit to the degree of self-sufficiency that can be achieved. 
However, it should be noted that the magnitudes of the point estimates for the 
importer’s population are consistently smaller than those of the exporter’s population.  
The difference between the respective point estimates is roughly 0.4 to 0.5 throughout the 
time period.  Similar differences in magnitude were found by Garman, Petersen, and 
Gilliard (1999).  In terms of magnitude, the importer’s population has less of an impact 
on bilateral trade.  
  As expected, distance has a strong negative effect on bilateral trade levels.  The 
distance elasticity of trade is generally consistent over the time period, ranging between  
–2.673 (for 1985) and –1.528 (for 1995).  These findings are consistent with previous 
research, although the magnitude of the coefficients is slightly larger than, for example, 
Breuss and Egger (1997, 1999), Frankel and Romer (1999), and Thoumi (1989a, 1989b).  
Probably transportation costs have a greater impact on smaller developing island 
economies than bigger developed ones.    15
  The estimated parameters for the three binary variables (colonial ties, the 
CARICOM regional grouping, and sharing a common language) are all statistically 
significant throughout the time period and the estimates are remarkably stable over time.  
Ceteris paribus, sharing colonial ties, being a member of the CARICOM, and sharing a 
common language all contribute significantly to higher bilateral trade levels.   
Since there are three binary variables included in the model, each taking on one of 
two possible values, there are in theory eight different possible combinations or 
outcomes.  Note, however, that Car and Col are mutually exclusive.  If a given country 
pair is assigned a value of 1 for Car, it means that both countries are members of the 
CARICOM, and would thus be assigned a value of 0 for Col. Conversely, if a pair is 
assigned a value of 1 for Col, it means that one country is a former British colony in 
CARICOM and the other is the UK, and thus the country pair would be assigned 0 for 
Car.  As such, the two outcomes of both Col and Car equal to 1 (with Lang equal to 
either 1 or 0) are not feasible.  Accordingly, there are six possible outcomes of relevance.  
Define the expected intercept, taking into account the effects of the binary variables in 
each of the six feasible cases as E[α
*].  Then the six outcomes of E[α
*] can be described 
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Note that Case ii and iv are not relevant for our sample of countries.  Case ii 
would refer to a CARICOM member’s trade with its colonial ruler that is not English   16
speaking.  All the countries in our sample are former UK colonies, and English is the 
official language, rendering this outcome irrelevant.  Case iv would be a CARICOM 
member’s trade with a fellow member with whom it would not share a common 
language; thus, this outcome would render itself irrelevant as well.  For the remaining 















As such, Ψ can be interpreted as the percentage change in the bilateral trade level, with 
ceteris paribus restrictions imposed on the continuous variables.  Ψ’s are calculated for 
all years in the sample and the results are presented in Table 2.   
Table 2: Interpretation of Binary Variables 




* β β α − = Ψ E  
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
Case  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11) 




































































































































* β β α − = Ψ E  
      
1991 1992  1993 1994 1995 1996          
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1  0.070 0.043 0.024 0.040        
vi
f 
0  0  0 0 0 0        
 
Parameter estimates used obtained from regression output, see Table 1. 
Description of trade: 
a) CARICOM member trade with the UK 
b) NA for our sample 
c) Intra-CARICOM Trade 
d) NA for our sample 
e) CARICOM member trade with the US and Canada 
f) CARICOM member trade with Mexico and the EU 
 
Due to the sample and the definition of the binary variables, the E[α
*] for Case vi would 
be the actual intercept, which would correspond to trade between a CARICOM member 
and Mexico or the EU.  Looking at the calculated values, a given CARICOM member 
would trade about 10-16% more with the UK (Case i) than they would with Mexico or 
the EU ceteris paribus.  Intra-CARICOM trade for a typical member (Case iii) is 15-20% 
higher than their trade with Mexico or the EU ceteris paribus.  Finally, Case v conveys   18
that a typical CARICOM member would trade roughly 4-7% more with the US and 




The empirical results suggest that the gravity model has considerable potential to 
explain intra-CARICOM bilateral trade as well as trade between CARICOM members 
and non-members.  The results suggest that the income levels of both the exporting and 
the importing countries have a large positive and symmetric effect on bilateral trade.  It is 
also shown that the CARICOM regional trade agreement, and the sharing of a common 
language and historical colonial ties have positive impacts on bilateral trade levels after 
controlling for the economic size and the physical size of the trading countries and the 
distance between them.   
The results indicate that exporters with larger populations have a larger 
productive base and more opportunities for scale economies and thus have a greater 
ability to export goods on the world market than does a smaller country. This is 
consistent with the pattern of CARICOM exports, which have been dominated by the 
larger member countries.  The effect of the importing country’s population was 
surprisingly enough positive.  This is harder to generalize, since a larger economy would 
indeed have a larger consumer base demanding imports, but large countries also tend to 
be more self-sufficient.  Clearly, our results suggest that the first effect dominates over 
the latter.   
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Table 1: Regression Estimates  
Dependent Variable: ln( exports from county i to country j ) 
             
  1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11) 


































  (4.168) (3.907) (4.042) (4.295) (4.144) (4.775) (4.358) (4.355) (4.446) (4.335) (4.921) 
ln(GDPi/Po
pi)  1.336** 1.145** 1.347** 1.045** 1.176** 1.384** 1.401** 1.257** 0.967** 1.046** 1.356** 
  (0.250) (0.227) (0.227) (0.231) (0.207) (0.241) (0.216) (0.200) (0.211) (0.191) (0.216) 
ln(Pop  i)  1.660** 1.622** 1.594** 1.791** 1.723** 1.881** 1.754** 1.671** 1.608** 1.791** 1.909** 
  (0.116) (0.105) (0.115) (0.115) (0.107) (0.115) (0.110) (0.109) (0.101) (0.100) (0.112) 
ln(GDPj/Po
pj)  1.336** 1.144** 1.347** 1.045** 1.176** 1.385** 1.401** 1.257** 0.967** 1.046** 1.356** 
  (0.250) (0.227) (0.227) (0.231) (0.207) (0.241) (0.216) (0.200) (0.212) (0.191) (0.216) 
ln(Pop  j)  1.203** 1.270** 1.192** 1.358** 1.379** 1.474** 1.370** 1.280** 1.319** 1.474** 1.559** 








2.230** -2.440** -2.673** -2.630** -2.238** -2.270** -2.049** -2.628**
  (0.288) (0.263) (0.288) (0.295) (0.277) (0.302) (0.286) (0.287) (0.265) (0.263) (0.294) 
Colonial  3.054** 2.852** 3.139** 2.954** 3.596** 3.806** 3.611** 2.837** 2.635** 2.682** 3.287** 
  (0.887) (0.822) (0.898) (0.911) (0.858) (0.918) (0.867) (0.850) (0.789) (0.781) (0.863) 
Caricom  5.237** 4.755** 4.134** 4.382** 3.883** 4.871** 3.964** 3.971** 3.265** 5.290** 5.481** 
  (0.742) (0.688) (0.735) (0.769) (0.734) (0.823) (0.769) (0.759) (0.732) (0.722) (0.806) 
Language  2.119**  2.419**  2.656**  2.328**  1.487* 1.746* 1.847* 1.732*  1.765**  1.964**  2.061** 
  (0.712) (0.649) (0.750) (0.753) (0.692) (0.759) (0.735) (0.720) (0.656) (0.638) (0.706) 
             
               23
R-squared 0.639 0.663 0.643 0.644 0.670 0.659 0.663 0.626 0.633 0.665 0.655 
F-stat  44.544 49.445 45.199 45.543 50.918 48.569 49.294 42.187 43.284 49.793 47.791 
N  210 210 210 210 210 210 209 210 210 210 210 
Standard errors in parenthesis 
*) Statistically significant at the 5 percent level 
**) Statistically significant at the 1 percent level 
a) Binary variable: 1 if one of the trading countries is the UK and the other a former British colony in the CARICOM, 0 otherwise 
b) Binary variable: 1 if both trading partners are members of CARICOM, 0 otherwise 
C) Binary variable: 1 if the trading countries share a common language, 0 otherwise 
 
Table 1 (continued) 
Dependent Variable: ln( exports from county i to country j )   
              
  1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996         
  (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17)          



















      
  (5.166) (4.364) (5.146) (4.416) (5.066) (5.968)           
ln(GDPi/Popi)  1.195** 0.953** 1.129** 1.202** 1.712** 1.597**          
  (0.206) (0.191) (0.229) (0.201) (0.251) (0.270)           
ln(Pop  i)  1.753** 1.466** 1.650** 1.568** 1.528** 1.657**          
  (0.115) (0.094) (0.105) (0.094) (0.109) (0.130)           
ln(GDPj/Popj)  1.195** 0.953** 1.129** 1.202** 1.712** 1.597**          
  (0.206) (0.191) (0.229) (0.201) (0.251) (0.270)           
ln(Pop  j)  1.241** 1.126** 1.203** 1.186** 1.086** 1.147**          
  (0.121) (0.099) (0.111) (0.099) (0.114) (0.141)           
ln(distance)  -1.773**  -1.805** -1.839** -1.783** -1.528** -1.782**        
  (0.295) (0.239) (0.273) (0.245) (0.281) (0.267)           
Colonial    2.289** 2.195** 2.445** 2.621** 3.203** 3.175**            24
  (0.904) (0.745) (0.829) (0.743) (0.866) (0.863)           
Caricom  5.471** 3.621** 4.913** 5.090** 6.588** 5.964**          
  (0.852) (0.690) (0.788) (0.684) (0.775) (1.041)           
Language  2.682**  2.314**  2.522**  1.519*  1.065  1.745*        
  (0.731) (0.591) (0.660) (0.604) (0.714) (0.733)           
               
               
               
R-squared  0.607 0.620 0.596 0.634 0.598 0.630           
F-stat  35.408 38.625 36.276 42.271 33.452 31.768           
N  192 198 204 204 189 158           
Standard errors in parenthesis 
*) Statistically significant at the 5 percent level 
**) Statistically significant at the 1 percent level 
a) Binary variable: 1 if one of the trading countries is the UK and the other a former British colony in the CARICOM, 0 otherwise 
b) Binary variable: 1 if both trading partners are members of CARICOM, 0 otherwise 
C) Binary variable: 1 if the trading countries share a common language, 0 otherwise   25
Table 2: Interpretation of Binary Variables 




* β β α − = Ψ E  
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
Case  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11) 






















































































































0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
 




* β β α − = Ψ E  
      
1991 1992  1993 1994 1995 1996          
Case  (12)  (13)  (14) (15) (16) (17)           




















1  0.070 0.043 0.024 0.040        
vi
f 
0  0  0 0 0 0        
Parameter estimates used obtained from regression output, see Table 1. 
Description of trade: 
a) CARICOM member trade with the UK 
b) NA for our sample 
c) Intra-CARICOM Trade 
d) NA for our sample 
e) CARICOM member trade with the US and Canada 
f) CARICOM member trade with Mexico and the EU 
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